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RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMIRALTY - JONES Ac-r - APPLICABILITY TO DREDGE EMPLOYEES AS SEA-
MEN - Petitioner, a laborer, was employed by respondent on a canal dig-
ging project. His duties were those of a handyman on respondent's dredge, 
which was temporarily attached to shore, and his work consisted of carry-
ing supplies from shore to the dredge, cleaning the dredge, and doing 
errands ashore. The employee was not a member of a maritime union, 
but -was a member of a laborers' union. He lived at home, worked on an 
eight hour shift, and brought his meals to his place of employment. He 
was not subject to the supervision of the officer of the dredge but received 
his orders from the labor foreman in charge of the construction project, 
who worked on shore. Petitioner had no duties connected with moving 
the dredge, and testified that he was never on it when it was pushed from 
one location to another. While in the course of his employment on shore, 
petitioner was injured and brought an action under the Jones Act against 
respondent in the city court. The court rendered judgment for the em-
ployee, and the corporation appealed. The Illinois appellate court re-
versed the judgment on the ground that there was insufficient evidence 
to support the jury's finding that petitioner was a member of a crew.1 
The Illinois Supreme Court denied a petition for appeal, and the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed and remanded. 
There was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's finding that petitioner 
was a member of the dredge's crew. Senko v. La Crosse Dredging Corp., 
352 U.S. 370 (1957). 
The Jones Act2 provides a cause of action for any seaman who shall 
suffer personal injury in the course of his employment. Initially the word 
"seaman" was construed broadly enough so as to include within the provi-
sions of the act stevedores who were injured while temporarily on board 
ship.3 However, Congress later set forth separate protection for stevedores 
by passing the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,4 
and as a result the Supreme Court held that the Longshoremen's Act, by 
implication, restricted the benefits of the Jones Act to members of the crew 
of a vessel.5 Thus in the instant case petitioner had to place himself in 
the status of a crew member in order to recover under the Jones Act.6 
The court pointed out that it was not a controlling factor that the dredge 
was connec,ted to shore since an employee may still retain his status as a 
17 Ill. App. (2d) 307, 129 N.E. (2d) 454 (1955). 
2 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §688. 
8 International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926). See ROBINSON, AD-
MIRALTY §40, p. 318 (1939). 
4 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. (1952) §901. 
5 Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. I (1946). 
6 The court did not pass upon whether another requirement for the application of 
the Jones Act was met, i.e., whether the dredge to which the employee was attached was 
in fact upon navigable water.;. 
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crew member while the vessel is anchored or berthed,7 nor was it con-
trolling that the injury to petitioner occurred on land, so long as the 
employee of the vessel was engaged in the course of his employment at 
the time of the injury.8 In a previous decision9 the Supreme Court had 
held that an employee's status as a crew member for purposes of the Jones 
Act turned on questions of fact and that if the jury's finding had evidence 
to support it, such finding was to be conclusive. The majority in the 
principal case explained this holding as meaning that the jury is to have 
the .;ame discretion in determining that fact question as with any other, 
and that the jury's decision is final, if supported by evidence, regardless 
of whether or not the reviewing court agrees with the jury's estimate. 
Upon reviewing the evidence in the record, the majority felt that there 
was sufficient evidence to support the finding that petitioner was a member 
of the dredge's crew. The minority, however, felt that there was not 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding and relied on previous 
cases which had held that for an employee to be a crew member, he must 
have some connection, more or less permanent, with a ship and ship's 
company, and that he be naturally and primarily on board to aid in 
navigation.10 There is much merit to the dissent's point of view. To say 
under the facts of this case that petitioner's duties were naturally and 
primarily in aid of navigation is to stretch these words to an extreme 
limit.11 Admittedly, in these days of technical development and speciali-
zation, it becomes increasingly more difficult to categorize a vessel's em-
ployee as being naturally and primarily on board to aid in navigation, 
but in those cases in the "twilight area" wherein the courts have held the 
employee to be a seaman, the employee did have a connection ·with a ship 
and ship's company.12 In the principal case, however, petitioner's con-
nection appeared not to be with the vessel but with the laboring gang 
ashore, especially since he was under the direct supervision of the foreman 
7 But if the vessel has been withdrawn from navigation for the winter season, the 
seaman will lose his crew member status. Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., (1st Cir. 1941) 
123 F. (2d) 991; Antus v. Interocean S.S. Co., (6th Cir. 1939) 108 F. (2d) 185; Desper v. 
Starved Roel< Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 (1952). 
8 O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge and Docl< Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943). 
9 South Chicago Coal and Docl< Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940). 
10 South Chicago Coal and Docl< Co. v. Bassett, note 9 supra, (laborer on coal refueling 
barge, who aided in fueling other vessels but who had no duties while barge was in 
motion, held not a crew member); Desper v. Starved Roel< Ferry Co., note 7 supra, 
(seasonal crew member of vessel held not a crew member during winter season while 
working on repair of vessels). 
11 The term "navigation" has already been somewhat "stretched" in this regard. "But 
navigation is not limited to 'putting over the helm.' It also embraces duties essential for 
other purposes of the vessel. Certainly members of the crew are not confined to those 
who can 'hand, reef and steer.'" Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565 at 572 (1944). 
12 The employees in the following cases were held to be seamean and presumably 
would be crew members for the purposes of the Jones Act: a·cook, The James H. Shrigley, 
(N.D. N.Y. 1892) 50 F. 287; a bartender, The J. S. Warden, (S.D. N.Y. 1910) 175 F. 314; 
a woman telephone operator, Keefe v. Matson Nav. Co., (W.D. Wash. 1930) 46 F. (2d) 
123; a member of a ship's orchestra, The Sea Lark, (W.D. Wash. 1926) 14 F. (2d) 201. 
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ashore. Under such a test it would appear that petitioner should not be 
considered a crew member entitled to the benefits of the Jones Act but 
should be left to his remedy under the state workmen's compensation act. 
Ross Kipka, S.Ed. 
